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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

In United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90
(E.D. Mich. 1972), and People v. Cutler, 12 BNA
Cnrx. L. REP. 2133 (Los Angeles County Ct.
Nov. 6, 1972), trial courts admitted the results
of polygraph examinations into evidence in
1

criminal cases.

In Ridling, the defendant was indicted for committing perjury before a grand jury. At trial, the
defendant offered the testimony of polygraph
experts purportedly demonstrating that he had not
perjured himself. The court indicated that it would
ceraccept the expert testimony, provided that
2
tain conditions, discussed below, were met.
In Cutler, the defendant was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana. The defendant
moved at a pre-trial hearing to exclude the marijuana on the ground that it was illegally seized.
The factual issue at the hearing was whether the
defendant had voluntarily submitted to the
search, on which point the defendant's testimony
and that of the police officer directly conflicted.
The defendant offered into evidence the results
of a polygraph examination which he had taken
purporting to show that he was telling the truth.
After hearing testimony on the reliability of the
polygraph, the court accepted the proffered evidence, excluding, on the basis of that evidence, the
seized marijuana.
In 1923, Frye v. United States4 held polygraph
evidence inadmissible, reasoning that the polygraph had not gained sufficient acceptance among
physiological and psychological experts. The courts
in Ridling and Cutler determined that polygraph
testing had been substantially improved since Frye
and concluded that, as a result of more advanced
equipment and testing techniques, the polygraph
2 In another recent case, United States v.Zeiger,350F.
Supp.685(D.D.C. 1972), a trial judg admitted a defendant's proffered polygraph evidence. This ruling,
however, was reversed on expedited appeal, per curiam
and without opinion._.F.2d_ (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2The trial judge in Ridfing noted that a perjury
case is ideally suited for admitting polygraph evidence.
Perjury is based on wilfully or knowingly giving false
evidence, which is exactly what the polygraph examination is designed to test.
3Experts testifying on the theory and uses of polygraph data indicated that polygraph tests are more
than 90% accurate.
4 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

has attained general acceptance as an effective
instrument for detecting deception. Thus, each
court decided that it was no longer controlled by
5
Frye.
Both courts also faced the issue of whether the
proffered evidence should be excluded on the
ground that the jury might consider the polygraph examiner's opinion conclusive on the issue
of guilt or innocence, thus intruding on the jury's
fact-finding role.8 In Ridling, the trial judge conceded that in a perjury case the polygraph evidence might well prove conclusive. The court,
however, reasoned that the evidence was so highly
probative that its use would benefit both the
defendant and society. The court analogized
polygraph evidence to other admissible scientific
evidence, such as blood and breathalizer tests in
intoxification cases and radar data in speeding
cases. In such cases, the court noted, the scientific
evidence virtually decides the factual issue, but is
admitted because of its high probative value and
objectivity.
In Ridling, the court established a stringent set
of standards governing the admissibility of polygraph evidence in ordir to lessen the possibility
that a jury might give too much weight to such
data and to prevent fraud or mistake by the
polygraph examiner. Since there are only minimum
standards for polygraph operators, the court
thought it might be difficult to adequately determine the reliability of the defendant's evidence.
Therefore, the court decided to appoint its own
expert witness to test the defendant. The court
ruled that if the defendant refused to be tested by
the court's expert, his polygraph evidence would
not be admitted. Furthermore, the court ordered
that if the court-appointed examiner was unable to
determine whether the defendant was telling the
truth,7 none of the polygraph evidence would be
5 These holdings do not conflict with Frye, but rather
meet the test Frye established for admitting expert
scientific testimony.
6See People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269
(1955), and People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255
N.E.2d 696 (1969), where polygraph data was rejected
on the ground that it intruded on the fact-finding role
of the jury.
'In 6% of properly administered polygraph examinations, the examiner is unable to determine if the
subject is telling the truth. The court thought that if
its expert felt the defendant was in this group so much
doubt would be cast on the defendant's evidence that
it should be excluded.
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admitted. However, if these conditions were met,
the testimony of both the defendant's experts and
the court's experts would be admitted, even though
conflicting.
In Cutler, the court did not establish such rigorous conditions for the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, perhaps because the evidence was not
heard by a jury. Cutler, however, cited Ridling
for the proposition that courts have sufficient
authority to control, limit, or condition the introduction of polygraph evidence in order not to
prejudice the trial process. It is possible, therefore,
that the Cutler court might institute controls similar to those in Ridling if a jury were to hear the
polygraph evidence.
Because the Ridling court conditioned admission
of defendant's polygraph evidence on his submitting to tests by a court-appointed expert, it examined the relationship between polygraph tests and
the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege issue could arise either if the court-appointed
expert testified in rebuttal to the defendant's
expert or if polygraph testimony was offered independently by the prosecutor. The court pointed
out three reasons why the privilege would not
ordinarily bar polygraph evidence. First, the privilege can be waived. If proper Miranda warnings
are given, the court felt that the taking of the test
would constitute a waiver. Second, the privilege
may not be involved at all. The court compared
taking a polygraph test to such nontestimonial
evidence as participating in a lineup, fingerprinting or giving blood to determine alcohol content.8
The court, of course, conceded that the defendant's
responses to the examiner's questions would be
testimonial evidence which would be excluded if
Miranda warnings were not given. However, the
court stated that if the statements made during the
polygraph test are admissible under Miranda, the
privilege is not violated by eliciting physiological
nontestimonial evidence at the same time. Third,
the very nature of the polygraph examination protects against violation of the privilege against selfincrimination. For a polygraph test to be scientifically valid, the defendant must voluntarily cooperate with the examiner. Thus, if the defendant
is coerced in any manner to participate in a poly-

graph test, the results of that test would be inadmissible since they would be scientifically invalid.
The Ridling court also held that polygraph evidence does not violate the hearsay rule. The hearsay problem arises because the polygraph examiner
must, to make his testimony relevant, report outof-court statements of the defendant. The court
contended, however, that the evidence is admissible because the questions of the examiner and the
answers of the defendant are not received into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
On the contrary, the answers have probative value
only as evidence of the physiological response of the
defendant as interpreted by the expert witness.
Thus, the testimony admitted is merely the opinion
of the expert on what he observes concerning the
defendant's physiological responses and what he
concludes regarding the truthfulness of the defendant. In any event, the court would admit
polygraph tests as an exception to the hearsay
rule because of their proven trustworthiness.9
Both the Ridling and Cutler courts recognized
that admitting polygraph evidence will have a
profound effect on the criminal justice system.
The Ridling court thought it likely that far fewer
cases would reach the trial stage if the polygraph
is used by the prosecution and the defense. Many
cases will be dismissed if the defendant is cleared
by a polygraph examination while the likelihood
of guilty pleas will be increased if he is not. As the
Cutler court pointed out, the great majority of
criminal trials turn on the credibility of witnesses
and to the extent that the polygraph aids courts in
measuring credibility, the criminal justice system
will be both more efficient and more just for defendants and society.

8 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held that
handwriting exemplars and blood tests, respectively,
are nontestimonial and therefore not protected by the
fifth amendment privilege.

"See FED. R. Ev. 803(24) (1971 Revised Draft),
which states that inherently trustworthy evidence is
admissible even if it would normally be inadmissible as
hearsay.
10406 U.S. 682 (1972).

LiNEups AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Last Term the United States Supreme Court
held in Kirby v. Illinois'0 that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach at lineups
until adversary judicial criminal proceedings
against the defendant have commenced. State
courts have given effect to this ruling in various
ways.
287
In Commonwealth v. Lopes, -Mass.-.,
N.E.2d 118 (1972), the lineup in question took
place after the defendant's arrest but before he
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tion lineups, it nevertheless required that before
had been indicted or otherwise formally charged
with any criminal offense. Although the trial any lineup is conducted the suspect be given the
judge found that the defendant waived his right right to contact an attorney or be informed that
to counsel at the lineup, the Massachusetts court one will be called if he is unable to hire one. The
found it unnecessary to rule on the waiver issue, court felt that counsel was necessary to prevent
15
reasoning, under Kirby, that the right to counsel lineups which are unnecessarily suggestive. To
had not attached. Lopes reversed the pre-Kirby this extent the Oklahoma court read Kirby narrule in Massachusetts that a pre-indictment lineup rowly, and reiterated that, for a lawful lineup,
is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution and counsel must be present or the right to counsel
therefore the right to counsel attaches when the affirmatively waived.
A third case interpretating Kirby is Arnold v.
defendant participates in such an identification."
The earlier Massachusetts rule was based on an State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972). The questioned
expansive reading of United States v. Wade 2 and lineup occurred after a complaint charging the
defendant had been filed and a warrant issued for
Gilbert v. California," which held that an in-court
identification of the defendant is inadmissible in his arrest, but before an indictment or information
evidence if its source was a lineup at which the had been filed.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that filing a comdefendant's right to counsel had been denied.
These cases have been thought to establish a plaint and issuing a warrant initiate "adversary
per se rule excluding identification since no direct criminal proceedings" within the meaning of
showing of unfairness at the lineup is required. Kirby, so that the right to counsel attaches at that
Lopes limits application of a per se exclusionary point.
Although Arnold ostensibly relies directly on the
rule to post-indictment lineups.
Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Crim. Court's opinion in Kirby, the result conforms
App. 1972), also involved a post-arrest, pre-arraign- more closely to the dissenting opinion of Justice
ment lineup. Prior to Kirby the Oklahoma rule was Marshall. justice Marshall contended that counsel
that the right to counsel attached at pre-indict- for lineups attaches at arrest, since possibre abuses
ment lineups. 14 Although the court in Chandler involved in identification procedures are the same
realized that after Kirby there is no constitutional whether the lineup occurs before or after indictright to counsel at pre-indictment or pre-informa- ment. The Arnold court's definition of adversary
judicial proceedings seemingly adopts Marshall's
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. view, since practically nothing more than arrest
591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970).
bad occurred in the case.
'2388 U.S. 218 (1968).
13388 U.S. 263 (1968).
5 The court cited Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
" State v. Thompson, 438 P.2d 287 (Okla. Crim. (1967), which held that due process prohibits suggestive
lineups.
App. 1968).

